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Abstract
Sponsored search involves running an auction among advertisers who bid in order to have their ad
shown next to search results for specific keywords. Currently, the most popular auction for sponsored
search is the “Generalized Second Price” (GSP) auction in which advertisers are assigned to slots in
the decreasing order of their score, which is defined as the product of their bid and click-through rate.
In the past few years, there has been significant research on the game-theoretic issues that arise in an
advertiser’s interaction with the mechanism as well as possible redesigns of the mechanism, but this
ranking order has remained standard.
From a search engine’s perspective, the fundamental question is: what is the best assignment of
advertisers to slots? Here “best” could mean “maximizing user satisfaction,” “most efficient,” “revenue-
maximizing,” “simplest to interact with,” or a combination of these. To answer this question we need
to understand the behavior of a search engine user when she sees the displayed ads, since that defines
the commodity the advertisers are bidding on, and its value. Most prior work has assumed that the
probability of a user clicking on an ad is independent of the other ads shown on the page.
We propose a simple Markovian user model that does not make this assumption. We then present an
algorithm to determine the most efficient assignment under this model, which turns out to be different
than that of GSP. A truthful auction then follows from an application of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism. Further, we show that our assignment has many of the desirable properties of GSP
that makes bidding intuitive. At the technical core of our result are a number of insights about the
structure of the optimal assignment.
1 Introduction
Targeted advertisements on search queries is an increasingly important advertising medium, attracting large
numbers of advertisers and users. When a user poses a query, the search engine returns search results
together with advertisements that are placed into positions, usually arranged linearly down the page, top
to bottom. On most major search engines, the assignment of ads to positions is determined by an auction
among all advertisers who placed a bid on a keyword that matches the query. The user might click on one or
more of the ads, in which case (in the pay-per-click model) the advertiser receiving the click pays the search
engine a price determined by the auction.
In the past few years, the sponsored search model has been highly successful commercially, and the
research community is attempting to understand the underlying dynamics, explain the behavior of the market
and to improve the auction algorithms. The most common auction being run today is the Generalized Second
Price (GSP) auction: Each bidder i submits a bid bi stating the maximum amount they are willing to pay for
a click, and the bidders are placed in descending order of bipi, where pi is what is called the click-through-rate
of advertiser i; i.e., the probability that a user will click on the ad, given that the user looks at it. Much
of previous research on sponsored search auctions has fixed this sort order, and focused on understanding
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the implications of different pricing schemes, assuming strategic behavior on the part of the advertisers. We
now know something about GSP’s equilibrium properties [9, 22, 4], alternative pricing that will make it
truthful [4], and to some extent, impact on the revenue in principle [9] and via simulations [21].
However, by fixing this sort order, prior work exogenizes an important third party in sponsored search;
i.e., the search engine user. Unfortunately, there is very little guidance on this in the literature, even though
the user’s behavior is the essential ingredient that defines the commodity the advertisers are bidding on, and
its value. We suggest a different framework for principled understanding of sponsored search auctions:
• Define a suitable probabilistic model for search engine user behavior upon being presented the ads.
• Once this model is fixed, ask the traditional mechanism design questions of how do assign the ads to
slots, and how to price them.
• Analyze the given mechanism from the perspective of the bidders (e.g., strategies) and the search
engine (e.g., user satisfaction, efficiency and revenue).
There are certain well-accepted observations about the user’s interaction with the sponsored search ads
that should inform the model: (i) The higher the ad is on the page, the more clicks it gets. (ii) The “better”
the ad is, the more clicks it gets, where the “goodness” of an ad is related to the inherent quality of the
ad, and how well it matches the user’s query. These properties govern not only how the auction is run but
also how advertisers think about their bidding strategy (they prefer to appear higher and get more clicks).
Thus it is important for an auction to have what we call intuitive bidding: a higher bid translates to a higher
position and more clicks.
In this paper, we propose a natural Markov model for user clicks, taking the above observations into
account and design an algorithm to determine an optimal assignment of ads to positions in terms of economic
efficiency. Together with VCG pricing, this gives a truthful auction. We further show that the optimal
assignment under this model has certain monotonicity properties that allow for intuitive bidding. In what
follows, we will describe our technical contributions in more detail.
Modeling the Search Engine User Previous work on sponsored search has (implicitly) modeled the
user using two types of parameters: ad-specific click-through rates pi and position-specific visibility factors
αj . There are some intuitive user behavior models that express overall click-through probabilities in terms
of these parameters. One possibility is “for each position j independently, the user looks at the ad i in that
position with probability αj then clicks on the ad with probability pi.” Alternatively: “The user picks a
single position according to the distribution implied by the αj ’s, and then clicks on the ad i in that position
with probability pi.” Under both these models, it follows that the probability of an ad i in position j
receiving a click is equal to piαj , which is the so-called separability assumption [4]. From separability it
follows that GSP ordering of ads will be suitable, because GSP ordering maximizes the total advertiser value
on the page.
In both these models there is no reason a priori that the position factors αj should be decreasing; this is
simply imposed because it makes sense, and it is verifiable empirically. Also, both suggested models assume
that the probability of an ad getting clicked is independent of other ads that appear with it on the page, an
assumption made without much justification. It is hard to imagine that seeing an ad, perhaps followed by a
click, has no effect on the subsequent behavior of the user.
In designing a user model, we would like to have the monotonicity of the positions arise naturally. Also,
each ad should have parameters dictating their effect on the user both in terms of clicking on that ad, as
well as looking at other ads. We propose a model based on a user who starts to scan the list of ads from the
top, and makes decisions (about whether to click, continue scanning, or give up altogether) based on what
he sees. More specifically, we model the user as the following Markov process: “Begin scanning the ads from
the top down. When position j is reached, click on the ad i with probability pi. Continue scanning with
probability qi.” In this model, if we try to write the click probability of an ad i in position j as piαj , we
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get that αj = Πi′∈Aqi′ , where A is the set of ads placed above
1 position j. Thus the “position factor” in
the click probability decreases with position, and does so naturally from the model. Also note that we do
not have separability anymore, since αj depends on which ads are above position j. Consequently, it can be
shown that GSP assignment of ads is no longer the most efficient.
Auction with Markovian users Given this new user model, we can now ask what the best assignment
is of ads to slots. We will study the most efficient assignment; i.e., the one that maximizes total advertiser
value derived from user clicks. It turns out that the structure of this assignment is different than that of
GSP, and indeed is more sophisticated than any simple ranking. The presence of the qi’s requires a delicate
tradeoff between the click probability of an ad and its effect on the slots below it. In this paper, we identify
certain structural properties of the optimal assignment and use them to find such an optimal assignment
efficiently, not only in polynomial time, but in near-linear time. Given this algorithm, a natural candidate
for pricing is VCG [23, 8, 12], which is clearly truthful in this setting.
Intuitive Bidding One of the reasons why GSP is successful is perhaps because bidding strategy is
intuitive: Under GSP ranking, if an advertiser bids more, they get to a higher position, and consequently, if
they bid more, their click probability increases. Now that we have defined a more sophisticated assignment
function, even though VCG pricing is truthful, the auction still may not have these intuitive properties. Our
main technical result is to show that in our model, if a mechanism uses the most efficient assignment, indeed
position and click probabilities are monotonic in an ad’s bid (with all other bids fixed), thus preserving
this important property. While not surprising, position-monotonicity turns out to be rather involved to
prove, requiring some delicate combinatorial arguments, and insights into the optimal substructure of bidder
assignments.
In summary, we approach sponsored search auctions as a three party process by modeling the behavior
of users first and then designing suitable mechanisms to affect the game theory between the advertiser and
the search engine. Our work sheds some light on the intricate connection between the user models and the
mechanisms; for example, the sort order of GSP that is currently popular (sort by bipi) is not optimal under
the Markov user model we propose here. More powerful models will be of great interest, such as making
the continuation probability qi a function of position as well, endogenizing the actions of the user as they
navigate on the landing page, etc. We leave it open to design truthful auctions under such extended models.
1.1 Related Work Sponsored search has been an active area of research in the last several years after
the early papers explored the foundational models [9, 4, 22, 14]. In general, the motivation for the work that
followed is that sponsored search in practice is much more complex than as described by the first models.
Some papers have taken on the effect of advertiser budgets [6, 18, 2], as well as analyzing bidder strategy
and dynamics [5, 20, 7, 10, 25, 24, 15]. There have also been several papers offering extensions to GSP, or
entirely new models and mechanisms [3, 13, 16, 11, 19, 17, 1].
1.2 Outline In Section 2 we define our model formally. In Section 3, we establish several properties of
optimal assignments in this model, including our main technical result that position and click probability
will be monotone in bid and match our intuition. We give our algorithm for finding an optimal assignment
in Section 4 which gives the truthful auction via VCG pricing, and conclude in Section 5.
2 Markov User Click Model
We consider a sponsored search auction with n bidders B = {1, . . . , n} and k positions. We will also refer
to “ad i,” meaning the advertisement submitted by bidder i. Each bidder i ∈ B has two parameters, pi and
qi. The click-through-rate pi is the probability that a user will click on ad i, given that they look at it. The
continuation probability qi is the probability that a user will look at the next ad in a list, given that they
look at ad i.
1Throughout the paper, we will often refer to a position or an ad being “higher” or “above” another position or ad; this
means that it is earlier on the list, and is looked at first by the user.
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Each bidder submits a bid bi to the auction, representing the amount that they value a click. The quantity
pibi then represents the value of an “impression,” i.e., how much they value a user looking at their ad. This
is commonly referred to as their “ecpm.”2 Throughout, we will use the notation ei = pibi for convenience.
Given an assignment (x1, . . . , xk) of bidders to the k positions, the user looks at the first ad x1, clicks on
it with probability px1 , and then continues looking with probability qx1 .
3 This is repeated with the second
bidder, etc., until the last ad is reached, or some continuation test has failed. Thus the overall expected
value of the assignment to the bidders is
ex1 + qx1(ex2 + qx2(ex3 + qx3(. . . qxn′−1(exn)))).
The goal of the auctioneer is to compute an assignment of ads to positions that maximizes the overall
expected value. Given this assignment, prices can be computed using VCG [23, 8, 12]: for each assigned
bidder we compute the change in others’ value if that bidder were to disappear. This assures truthful
reporting of bids under a profit-maximizing utility function.
3 Properties of Optimal Assignments
We will start analyzing some basic properties of the optimal assignment. Our insights will allow us to give
our main results regarding monotonicity of position and click probability, as well as an efficient algorithm
for finding this assignment.
3.1 Adjusted ECPM It turns out that the quantity ei/(1− qi), which we will refer to as the “adjusted
ecpm (a-ecpm),” plays a central role in this model. Intuitively, this quantity is the impression value adjusted
by the negative effect this bid has on the ads below it. We use ai = ei/(1−qi) for convenience. The following
theorem tells us how to assign a set of k selected ads to the k positions:
Theorem 1 In the most efficient assignment, the ads that are placed are sorted in decreasing order of
adjusted ecpm ai = ei/(1− qi).
Proof: Suppose not. Then in the ranking there are two consecutive ads i and i′ in positions j and j + 1
where
ei
1− qi
<
ei′
1− qi′
. (1)
The contribution of positions j . . . n to the efficiency of the ranking (given that position j is reached) is
ei + qi(ei′ + qi′ eˆ)
where eˆ is the efficiency of positions j + 2 . . . k given that position j + 2 is reached. If i and i′ are switched,
then the contribution would change to
ei′ + qi′(ei + qieˆ),
and nothing else would change. So since the former is the most efficient assignment, we have
ei + qi(ei′ + qi′ eˆ) > ei′ + qi′(ei + qieˆ)
and so
ei(1 − qi′) ≥ ei′(1− qi).
This contradicts (1). 
While this theorem tells us how to sort the ads selected, it does not tell us which k ads to select. One
is tempted to say that choosing the top k ads by a-ecpm would do the trick; however the following example
proves otherwise:
2The acronym ecpm stands for “expected cost per thousand” impressions, where M is the roman numeral for one thousand.
We will drop the factor of one thousand and refer to pibi as the “ecpm.”
3The click event and the continuation event could in principle have some correlation, and all our results will still hold.
However since we only consider expected value, we never use this correlation explicitly in our analysis.
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Example 1 Suppose we have three bidders and two slots, and the bidders have the following parameters:
Bidder ei qi ai = ei/(1− qi)
1 $1 .75 4
2 $2 .2 2.5
3 $0.85 .8 4.25
Let’s consider some possible assignments and their efficiency. If we use simple ranking by ecpm ei, we
get the assignment (2, 1), which has efficiency $2 + .2($1) = $2.20. If we use simple ranking by a-ecpm ai
we get the assignment (3, 1) with efficiency $0.85+ .8($1) = $1.65. It turns out that the optimal assignment
is (1, 2) with efficiency $1+ .75($2) = $2.50. The assigned bidders are ordered by a-ecpm in the assignment,
but are not the top 2 bidders by a-ecpm.
Now suppose we have the same set of bidders, but now we have three slots. The optimal assignment in
this case is (3, 1, 2); note how bidder 3 goes from being unassigned to being assigned the first position.
3.2 Notation for Assignments Theorem 1 implies that the optimal assignment can be described by the
set of assigned bidders, since this set will always be sorted by a-ecpm. For a set X of bidders, let e(X) be
the efficiency of an assignment that places only the set X , regardless of the number of bidders in X ; i.e., if
X = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n′} and wlog is sorted by a-ecpm, then
e(X) = e1 + q1(e2 + q2(e3 + q3(. . . qn′−1(en′)))).
Similarly, let q(X) be the overall continuation probability of the set X of ads: q(X) = Πi′∈Xqi′ . If X = ∅
we have e(X) = 0 and q(X) = 1.
Throughout the paper, we will also make use of the notation (A, x,B,C, y, . . . ) for a particular assignment,
where uppercase letters denote sets of bidders and lowercase letters denote single bidders. This denotes a
solution where the order of the bidders is as given, and where the order within a set is by a-ecpm (breaking
ties using a lexicographic order on bidders). So in this example, the solution would put all the bidders of
A first in a-ecpm order, followed by bidder x, followed by the bidders of B in a-ecpm order, etc. Note that
this notation could express suboptimal solutions (for the particular set of bidders) if the elements are not in
order of ecpm. We use e(·) and q(·) to denote the efficiency and continuation probability of such solutions.
3.3 Bidder Dominance In classical sponsored search with simple ranking, a bidder j can dominate
another bidder i by having higher ecpm; i.e., bidder j will always appear whenever i does, and in a higher
position. Example 1 above shows that having a higher ecpm (or a-ecpm) does not allow a bidder to dominate
another bidder in our new model. However, we show in this section that if she has higher ecpm and a-ecpm,
then this does suffice. This is not only interesting in its own right, it is essential for proving deeper structural
properties in later sections.
Theorem 2 For all bidders i in an optimal assignment, if some bidder j is not in the assignment, and
aj ≥ ai and ej ≥ ei, then we may substitute j for i, and the assignment is no worse.
Proof: Consider some bidder i that appears in an optimal assignment, and some j that does not appear in
the assignment, such that ej ≥ ei and aj ≥ ai. Let (X, i, Y ) be the optimal assignment, where X is the
sequence of bidders above i and Y is the sequence below i. The efficiency of the assignment (X, i, Y ) is
e(X) + q(X)(ei + qie(Y )). The efficiency of the assignment (X, j, Y ) is e(X) + q(X)(ej + qje(Y )). Suppose
qj ≥ qi; then clearly (X, j, Y ) is as efficient as (X, i, Y ) since ej ≥ ei, and the theorem is proven. Thus we
assume that qi > qj for the remainder of the proof. Note that aj ≥ ai is equivalent to:
ej − ei ≥
ei(qi − qj)
1− qi
(2)
Now consider the assignment (X,Y ), with efficiency e(X) + q(X)e(Y ). Since (X, i, Y ) is optimal, we get
e(X) + q(X)e(Y ) ≤ e(X) + q(X)(ei + qie(Y )),
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i.e., e(Y ) ≤ ei/(1−qi). Combining this with (2), and using the fact that qi > qj , we get ej−ei ≥ e(Y )(qi−qj)
which can be rewritten as
ej + qje(Y ) ≥ ei + qie(Y ).
This implies that the solution (X, j, Y ) is as efficient as (X, i, Y ). 
3.4 Subset Substructure in Optimal Assignments In this section we give a theorem that shows some
subset structure between optimal assignments to different numbers of slots. This theorem is used to prove
position monotonicity, and is an essential ingredient of our algorithm. Let OPT(C, j) denote the set of all
optimal solutions for filling j positions with bidders from the set C.
Theorem 3 Let j ∈ {1, . . . , k} be some number of positions, and let C be an arbitrary set of bidders. Then,
for all S ∈ OPT(C, j − 1), there is some S′ ∈ OPT(C, j) where S′ ⊃ S.
Proof: We proceed by induction on j, the base case j = 1 being simple. Let S be some solution in
OPT(C, j − 1), and let S′ be the solution in OPT(C, j) with the most bidders in common with S. We will
refer to an ad being “above” another ad if it has higher a-ecpm. Let x be the highest bidder in S′.
If x does not appear in S, then we claim that the solution (x, S) must be in OPT(C, j): Once x is chosen
for S′, taking any set in OPT(C\x, j−1) for the remaining positions will result in an optimal solution; the set
S is such a set, since by assumption it does not include x, and is in OPT(C, j−1). But if (x, S) ∈ OPT(C, j)
the theorem is proven, so we may assume x ∈ S.
Let A be the set of ads in S above x, and so we can write S = (A, x,Q) and S′ = (x,Q′). We claim
Q′ ⊃ Q. To see this, consider the set L of all ads that have lower a-ecpm than x. By the optimality of S, we
have Q ∈ OPT(L, j′) for j′ = j − |A| − 1 < j. By induction there is a Q′′ ∈ OPT(L, j − 1) where Q′′ ⊃ Q.
Thus we must have Q′ ⊃ Q since S′ is the solution with the most bidders in common with S. Decompose
Q′ as Q′ = (B +X,D, z, E) where
• z is the lowest ad in S′ that does not appear in S,
• E is the set of ads below z in S′ (this can be empty),
• D is the maximal set of ads immediately above z in S′ that also appear in S (this can be empty),
• X are the remaining ads in S′ that do not appear in S,
• B are the remaining ads (besides x) that appear in both S and S′.
Let B′ = B ∪ x. Note that by the definitions above we may write S = (A,B′, D,E). We have e(S) =
e(A,B′, D,E) ≥ e(B′ +X,D,E) since S ∈ OPT(C, j − 1) and |(B′ +X,D,E)| = j − 1. Decomposing this
a bit gives
e(A,B′, D) + q(A)q(B′)q(D)e(E)
≥ e(B′ +X) + q(B′)q(X)e(D,E). (3)
We also note that
e(S′) = e(B′ +X,D, z, E)
= e(B′ +X) + q(B′)q(X)e(D, z,E). (4)
Let S′′ = (A,B′, D, z, E). The remainder of the proof will show that e(S′′) ≥ e(S′), which implies the
theorem since |S′′| = j, S′′ ⊃ S and S′ ∈ OPT(C, j). We can rewrite e(S′′) as follows:
e(S′′) = e(A,B′, D) + q(A)q(B′)q(D)e(z, E)
≥ e(B′ +X) + q(B′)q(X)e(D,E)
+ q(A)q(B′)q(D)(e(z, E)− e(E)) (5)
= e(S′)− q(B′)q(X)(e(D,E)− e(D, z,E))
+ q(A)q(B′)q(D)(e(z, E)− e(E)) (6)
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In the above, (5) follows from (3), and (6) follows from (4). Rearranging, and using
e(D,E)− e(D, z,E) = q(D)(e(E)− e(z, E)),
we get
e(S′′)− e(S′)=q(B′)q(D)(q(A) − q(X))(e(z, E)− e(E)).
We know that e(z, E) ≥ e(E) since otherwise e(B′ + X,D,E) > e(B′ + X,D, z, E) = e(S′), and this
cannot be since S′ ∈ OPT(C, j). We claim that q(A) ≥ q(X), which would imply e(S′′) ≥ e(S′) and thus
complete the proof. This is trivially true if A = X = ∅. Since |A| = |X | by the definitions above, we can
assume both A and X are non-empty. consider some y ∈ A and y′ ∈ X . We have y /∈ S′ by the definition of
A. Since S′ is the solution in OPT(C, j) with the most bidders in common with S′, we must not be able to
substitute y for y′ in S, and thus by Lemma 2 we must have that ey′ > ey or ay′ > ay. But by the definitions
of A and X , we have ay ≥ ax ≥ ay′ . Therefore ey′ > ey. The previous two inequalities imply qy > qy′ . Since
y and y′ were arbitrary and |A| = |X |, this gives q(A) > q(X). 
3.5 Monotonicity of Position and Click Probability In this section we give our main theorem re-
garding the structure of the optimal assignments in the Markovian click model: that position and click
probability are monotonic in a bidder’s bid, with all other bids fixed. This is a fundamental property that
makes the bidder’s interaction with the system intuitive, and allows the bidder to adjust her bid intelligently
without global knowledge of the other bids.
Theorem 4 With all other bids fixed, the probability of receiving a click in the optimal solution is non-
decreasing in one’s bid. In addition, the position of a particular bidder in the optimal solution is monotonic
that bidder’s bid.
Proof: As bidder x increases her bid bx with all other bids fixed, the value of a particular solution S =
(A, x,B) increases linearly as q(A)px · bx + [e(A) + q(A)qxe(B)]. (Solutions not involving x stay constant.)
Let S1, . . . , Sk denote the sequence of optimal solutions that occurs as bx increases from 0. Solution S1
is the best solution not involving x, and Sk is the best solution that puts x in the first position. By the
fact that each solution increases linearly by the term q(A)px · bx, which is the probability that x receives a
click in that solution, it must be the case that for a new solution to become optimal it gives x a higher click
probability than in the previous solution; i.e., for all i ≥ 0, Si+1 gives x a higher click probability than Si.
This proves the first part of the theorem.
Now suppose the second part of the theorem is false. Then, there must be some consecutive solutions
Si and Si+1 where x has a higher position in Si than in Si+1. Let b be the bid that makes both Si and
Si+1 optimal, which must exist since they are consecutive in the list of optimal solutions, and fix b for the
remainder of the proof. Decompose the two solutions as Si+1 = (A, x,E) and Si = (F, x,G) where |A| > |F |
by assumption, and q(A) > q(F ) by the argument that proved the first part of the theorem. Since both
solutions are optimal, they are both sorted by a-ecpm, with ties broken lexicographically.
We claim that A ∩ G = ∅. If this were not the case then some bidder y would appear in both A and
G, but since both Si and Si+1 are sorted by ecpm, and y appears on different sides of x, this must mean
that y has the same a-ecpm as x. But, this violates our assumption on how the algorithm breaks ties among
different orderings of the same set. Using similar logic, we get F ∩ E = ∅.
By the optimality of Si+1 and the fact that F ∩E = ∅, we get E ∈ OPT(B \ (F ∪A ∪ {x}), n− |A| − 1).
Since |F | < |A|, Theorem 3 then implies that there is some G′ ∈ OPT(B \ (F ∪A∪ {x}), n− |F | − 1) where
G′ ⊃ E. Even if G′ 6= G, the set G′ could replace G in Si (since A ∩G = ∅) and still be optimal, and so we
define S′i = (F, x,G
′) and have e(S′i) = e(Si). Note that by the definition of G
′, we have A ∩G′ = ∅.
Since A∩G′ = ∅ and |A| > |F |, there must be some bidder in A that does not appear in S′i. Let a be the
first such bidder (by a-ecpm). Decompose A into (C, a,D) where C and D are those bidders with higher and
lower a-ecpm than a, respectively. Note that C ⊆ F , by the definition of a. Let F1 be the smallest prefix of
F (by a-ecpm) that contains all of C, and let F2 = F − F1.
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Similarly, since A ∩ G′ = ∅ and |G| > |E|, we let t ∈ G′ be the first bidder (by a-ecpm) that does not
appear in Si+1. Let G
′
1 be the bidders in G
′ with higher a-ecpm than t, and G′2 = G
′ −G′1 − t. Note G
′
1 is
also a prefix of E, and let E2 = E −G′1.
Given these definitions, we define nine different solutions that we will use in our proof (renaming S′i and
Si+1 for clarity):
α = Si+1 = (A, x,E) = (C, a,D, x,E)
α′ = (C,D, x,E) = (C,D, x,G′1, E2)
β = S′i = (F, x,G
′) = (F, x,G′1, t, G
′
2)
β′ = (F, x,G′1, G
′
2)
γ = (C,D, x,E + t) = (C,D, x,G′1, t, E2)
δ = (F1, a, F2, x,G
′
1, G
′
2)
ζ = (C, a, F1 − C,F2, x,G
′
1, G
′
2)
ζ′ = (C,F1 − C,F2, x,G
′
1, G
′
2)
η = (C,F1 − C, a, F2, x,G
′
1, G
′
2)
In the following claims we will often use the generic identity
e(X, y, Y )− e(X,Y ) = q(X)(ey − (1− qy)e(Y )) (7)
Claim 1 e(γ)− e(α′) > e(β)− e(β′)
Proof: Using (7), we can rewrite the claim as
q(C,D, x,G′1)(et − (1− qt)e(E2))
> q(F, x,G′1)(et − (1− qt)e(G
′
2)). (8)
Since q(C,D, x) ≥ q(C, a,D, x) = q(A, x), and q(F ) < q(A), we get q(C,D, x,G′1) > q(F, x,G
′
1), and so it
remains to prove e(E2) ≤ e(G′2). But this follows from the optimality of β, since E2 could replace G
′
2 in
solution β (indeed, E2 ⊂ G′2). 
Claim 2 e(ζ)− e(ζ′) ≥ e(α)− e(α′)
Proof: Using (7), we can rewrite the claim as
q(C)(ea − (1 − qa))e(F1 − C,F2, x,G
′
1, G
′
2))
≥ q(C)(ea − (1− qa)e(D, x,E)). (9)
Since (F1 − C,F2, x,G′1, G
′
2) has the same length as (D, x,E), and does not contain a or any bidders in
C, it could replace (D, x,E) in α; but since α is optimal, we may conclude that e(D, x,E) ≥ e(F1 −
C,F2, x,G
′
1, G
′
2), which proves the claim. 
Note that e(η) ≥ e(ζ), since all bidders in F1 have a higher a-ecpm than a. Finally, note that a simple
application of (7) gives
e(η)− e(ζ′) = e(δ)− e(β′) (10)
We now conclude the proof with the following contradiction:
e(α)− e(α′) ≥ e(γ)− e(α′) (by opt. of α)
> e(β)− e(β′) (Claim 1)
≥ e(δ)− e(β′) (by opt. of β)
= e(η)− e(ζ′) (by (10))
≥ e(ζ)− e(ζ′)
≥ e(α)− e(α′) (by Claim 2)
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4 Computing the Optimal Assignment
In this section we give algorithms for computing the optimal assignment of bidders to positions using the
structural properties we proved in the previous section. We begin with a simple dynamic program that gives
an O(n log n+ nk) time algorithm. We then show how our insights from the previous sections give a faster
O(n log n+ k2 log2 n) time algorithm.
4.1 Optimal Assignment using Dynamic Programming The algorithm proceeds as follows. First,
sort the ads in decreasing order of a-ecpm in time O(n log n). Then, let F (i, j) be the efficiency obtained
(given that you reach slot j) by filling slots (j, . . . , k) with bidders from the set {i, . . . , n}. We get the
following recurrence:
F (i, j) = max(F (i+ 1, j + 1)qi + ei, F (i+ 1, j)).
Solving this recurrence for F (1, 1) yields the optimal assignment, and can be done in O(nk) time.
4.2 Near-linear Time Algorithm Let B = {1, . . . , n} be the set of bidders, sorted by a-ecpm. Suppose
we had an oracle that told us, for any j, j′ ∈ B, the bidder y with j ≤ y ≤ j′ that maximizes f(qy, ey) for
an arbitrary linear function f . We will later show how to construct this oracle, but first we describe our
algorithm that uses this oracle.
Our algorithm will construct a solution Si ∈ OPT(B, i) for all i = 1, . . . , k, the final one Sk being the
overall optimum. By Theorem 3, we may assume that Si+1 ⊃ Si. Using this fact, our algorithm builds Si+1
from Si by simply finding argmaxx/∈Si e(Si ∪ {x}). To perform this max, the algorithm first guesses (i.e.,
searches exhaustively for) the a-ecpm rank of the new bidder x among the bidders in Si; this a number ℓ
from 1 to i + 1. Let {s1, . . . , si} be the elements of Si sorted by decreasing a-ecpm. The new bidder x has
a-ecpm between sℓ−1 and sℓ, and so e(Si∪{x}) = e(s1, . . . , sℓ−1)+q(s1, . . . , sℓ−1)(ex+qxe(sℓ, . . . , si)). Since
e(Si ∪ {x}) is linear in (qx, ex), we may appeal to the oracle to find the bidder x that maximizes e(Si ∪ {x})
among all bidders with a-ecpm between that of sℓ−1 and sℓ. We make i + 1 calls to this oracle for each
i, and thus O(k2) calls overall. To get the coefficients of e(Si ∪ {x}) to pass to the oracle, we precompute
the quantities q(s1, . . . , sp) and e(sp, . . . , si) for all p. (This can be done in O(k) time per i, for O(k
2) time
overall.)
It remains to show how to implement the oracle. We first preprocess the sequence [1, . . . , n] of bidders
as follows. We consider the dyadic intervals [α2β + 1, . . . , (α + 1)2β] for each possible α, β, for a total of
O(n) intervals. Note that any subsequence [j, . . . , j′] is made up of at most O(log n) such intervals. For
each such interval, we will make a data structure that can find max f(qx, ex) over bidders in that interval in
O(log n) time. So overall, given [j, . . . , j′], the oracle takes the max of O(log n) calls to the data structure,
and completes in O(log2 n) time.
The data structure we compute for a particular interval [α2β + 1, . . . , (α + 1)2β] is simply the convex
hull of the points (qx, ex) in two-dimensional space defined by bidders x in the interval. We can compute
all these convex hulls in O(n log n) time by successively merging convex hulls for increasing β. Given the
convex hull (with the points sorted in order of qx for example), a simple binary search can find the point
maximizing f(qx, ex) in O(log n) time.
This gives,
Theorem 5 Consider the auction with n Markovian bidders and k slots. There is an optimal assignment
which can be determined in O(n log n+ k2 log2 n) time.
It follows that using VCG pricing with this optimal assignment, we obtain a truthful mechanism for
sponsored search with Markovian users.
5 Concluding Remarks
We approached sponsored search auctions as a three party process by modeling the behavior of users first
and then designing suitable mechanisms to affect the game theory between the advertiser and the search
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engine. This formal approach shows an intricate connection between the user models and the mechanisms.
There are some interesting open issues to understand about our model and mechanism. For example, in
order to implement our mechanism, the search engine needs to devise methods to estimate the parameters
of our model, in particular, qi’s. This is a challenging statistical and machine learning problem. Also, we
could ask how much improvement in efficiency and/or revenue is gained by using our model as opposed to
VCG without using our model.
More powerful models will also be of great interest. One small extension of our model is to make
the continuation probability qi a function of location as well, which makes the optimization problem more
difficult. We can also generalize the Markov model to handle arbitrary configurations of ads on a web page
(not necessarily a search results page), or to allow various other user states (such as navigating a landing
page). Finally, since page layout can be performed dynamically, we could ask what would happen if the
layout of a web page were a part of the mechanism; i.e., a function of the bids.
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